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Borders in Central and Eastern Europe witnessed stark changes in 
recent decades.  Frontiers went from high security zones during the 
Cold War to far more open borders as socialism retreated.  Yet, the 
subsequent eastward shift of the European Union‟s Schengen border 
control system returned some borders to high security status, with only 
a few later shedding such status as the system moved further eastwards.  
Beyond discerning how the Schengen border undercuts the EU‟s effort 
to promote non-discrimination and other liberal values, this article also 
shows how Schengen holds the power to further entrench perceptions 
of ethnic hierarchy. 
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Introduction  
During the socialist era, borders across Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) tended to be high security zones with minimal cross border traffic.  
It was a stark contrast to communist elites‟ professed „friendship‟ 
between socialist countries. Such strict controls did little to further 
amicable relations among those separated by borders.  When no longer 
subject to the contradiction between the „socialist brotherhood‟ rhetoric 
of the communist era coinciding with intensive border policing, 
newfound freedom of movement catalyzed many incidents of intolerance. 
Visa-free travel nevertheless soon allowed border residents to see that 
their fears about each other were overblown and, more importantly, to get 
accustomed to ethnic intermingling as a regular, everyday occurrence.  
 
After five years of relative openness, several borders in East-Central 
Europe such as the Polish-German and Czech-German borders were once 
again subject to substantial increases in policing with the eastward 
movement of the EU‟s outer Schengen frontier.  Established towards the 
end of the Cold War, „Schengen‟ refers to the EU‟s well-fortified outer 
border control system largely designed to soothe West European fears of 
sizeable population movements from the east and south.  Formally 
speaking, it is an intergovernmental convention among consenting EU 
member states that lays down common rules for customs, visa, asylum, 
police, and border control.  The construction of this „hard‟ outer frontier 
has not only been a key part of Western Europe‟s post-cold war security 
policy, it has also been instrumental for promoting free movement within 
„Schengenland‟ and the idea of creating a „Europe of the regions.‟ 
 
In April 1998, the Austrian-Hungarian, Austrian-Czech, and Italian-
Slovenian borders also became hard borders after earlier Schengen 
signatories judged Austria and Italy fit to conduct the required policing – 
at least until the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia themselves 
joined Schengenland in 2007.  Taking the Polish-German border as an 
example, evidence of heightened policing comes from the fact that the 
number of German personal working in border control and funding 
allotted for this task went from 24,982 and DM 1.3 million ($ 650,000) in 
1989 to 40,100 and DM 2.9 million ($ 1.45 million) in 1997 (Bort 1999:  
84). 
 
Yet, the Schengen system holds the drawbacks for promoting the liberal 
values central to EU non-discrimination policy for at least two reasons:  
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(1) CEE countries have had to adopt the system while several older EU 
member states have the right to opt out, and (2) Schengen ironically 
replicates in a way the illiberal Soviet-era border regime (though not 
within the Single Market itself). The EU, in fact, only finally established 
the „Wider Europe‟ initiative in March 2003 to deal more systematically 
with its new neighbors.  Rather diplomatically problematic, however, was 
the document‟s tendency to associate the western CIS with the Middle 
East and North Africa (Ukraine, Poland 2003:  1), an idea congruent with 
what Wojciech Sadurski has called the veritable return of the menacing 
„Tartar hordes‟ in the European popular imagination (Sadurski 2002:  
A9). 
 
Beyond replicating some Soviet border control practices, the lack of 
flexibility in regard to incoming states – particularly when the EU offered 
present members flexible options – does not breed respect for liberal 
values and suggests a second class status for new and incoming states.  
That the EU allows the UK, Ireland, and Denmark to be partially outside 
the Schengen system (and non-members such as Iceland and Norway to 
be partially in) signals a stark difference in treatment. Prior to Poland‟s 
joining the Schengen zone, Wojciech Sadurski reflected on the situation 
in Rzeczpospolita: 
 
      In the past, new member states had easier demands:  the Schengen 
system was not as rigorously tied to the conditions of membership.  For 
example, in spite of Italy and Greece‟s membership in the EU these 
countries had to wait seven years to be accepted to Schengen because for 
that long the other signatories did not truly trust in their ability to defend 
the borders.  In our case – without certain border security (according to 
EU criteria) there would not be talk of joining the club. 
     A great asymmetry rules relations between the EU and us that we have 
to realize and that is particularly apparent in relation to borders and 
immigration. 
     Everything indicates that the EU precedes with seriousness and 
distrust to our – and in the future their – borders.  The costs to the 
candidate countries will be high.  We pay the price of unavoidable 
decline of border trade while the Hungarians‟ require exit visas for 
Hungarians living in Romania (Sadurski 2002:  A9). 
 
Border trade is key in economically depressed border regions with 
borders serving as both markers and reinforcers of economic difference.  
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Hungary faces the rather unique situation of Schengen dividing the 
country from sizeable Hungarian minorities in Romania and in Serbia‟s 
Vojvodina – until at least Romania joins the Schengen system. 
 
This article concentrates on Poland and Hungary as these countries had to 
make sizeable preparations on their borders for the shifting Schengen 
system.  It has several aims:  (1)  to show why Schengen fits rather 
awkwardly in post-Cold War CEE, namely because it was a product of 
another time and place; (2) to demonstrate that Schengen‟s 
implementation only furthered ethnic hierarchies – in earlier times at the 
Czech-German and Polish-German borders and still at the Hungarian-
Romanian and Polish-Ukrainian borders; and finally (3) to show that 
Schengen‟s inadvertent reinforcement of the idea of creating a „Europe of 
the regions‟ suggests a changing balance of power among Europe‟s less 
historically secure nationalities that can appear threatening.  In fact, the 
position of Hungary – with the main Hungarian center-right party using 
EU expansion as a means to reunify the Hungarian nation – could 
become especially problematic if interpreted as a security concern for 
Romania and Slovakia.  European integration can amplify what Zsuzsa 
Csergő and James Goldgeier have labeled „transsovereign nationalism‟ 
(Csergő and Goldgeier 2004:  26) – a form of nationalist politics in which 
a national centers (such as Budapest) develop specific institutions and 
policies that reinforce and even increase the sense of shared nationhood 
linking the state (Hungary) with kin next door (Hungarians in Romania, 
Slovakia, etc.). 
 
History explains why the idea of creating a „Europe of the regions‟ can 
mean something different in CEE.  While border regions here generally 
tend to have poorly developed infrastructure and industry as well as 
lower concentrations of population – like in Western Europe, unique to 
the region are the lingering effects of border shifts as well as population 
expulsions and transfers based on ethnicity during and after the Second 
World War.  Not only have societies and elites not come to terms with 
the expulsions and related movements, but the settlers who replaced those 
departing to often have weaker ties to their new localities – making them 
more susceptible to negative stereotypes concerning people living on the 
other side of the border.  Such a historical experience ultimately makes 
border regions a bit different than most of their counterparts in the earlier 
EU-15 wherein there is a greater degree of knowledge of those living on 
the other side, ethnic-intermingling, and far fewer recent boundary 
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changes – though certainly sharing a tendency to be underdeveloped with 
respect to the center.   
 
The Creation of the Schengen Border System 
Emerging in the second half of the 1980s, Schengen was an effort to 
make good on the goals established at Rome in 1957 and reiterated in the 
1985 Single European Act – that is, to bring down borders for the free 
movement of EU nationals, allowing them to work and live anywhere in 
the Union.  Signed initially by France, Germany, and the Benelux 
countries, the First Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of 
Checks at the Common Borders from July 1985 aimed to remove controls 
on movement as quickly as possible, while stopping well short of 
articulating a general European policy on immigration and asylum. This 
agreement had two ultimate goals: (1) to harmonize signatories‟ visa 
regulations, and in certain cases, policies concerning aliens‟ law; and  (2)  
to test the waters for the application of such a border control system 
along other internal borders (Lavenex 1999:  36). 
 
Prior to extending invitations to other states, however, these same five 
mavericks furthered their commitment towards border control 
harmonization by agreeing to extensive regulations concerning 
immigration and asylum in the 1990 Second Schengen Agreement.  
Formulated largely by national interior ministry representatives 
preoccupied with internal security (i.e. issues of immigration and crime), 
the second agreement was a key step in harmonizing this ambitious 
border control regime by establishing guidelines for dealing with citizens 
of non-member states categorized as „third country nationals.‟  Designed 
to handle the steep increase in population flows from the East, this 
second agreement maintains that a Schengen signatory may refuse to 
consider an asylum claim made by a third state national if s/he traveled 
previously through a „safe third country‟ – a non-member state 
signatories deem safe for refugees – to reach the desired country of 
destination.  Given that many intending to claim asylum in EU-15 
countries travel through CEE prior to reaching Western Europe, being 
categorized as a „safe third country‟ inadvertently drew CEE states into 
the emerging European refugee policy beginning in the early 1990s 
(Lavenex 1999:  51).   
 
Despite sharp disagreement over harmonizing such policies, most EU 
member states had, in fact, joined the Schengen system by the mid-
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1990‟s.  After a 5-year preparatory period following German 
reunification, Schengen controls finally came into force for France, 
Germany, the Benelux countries, Spain, and Portugal in March 1995.  
Not long thereafter Schengen became part of the EU‟s framework 
following the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, with special 
arrangements made for Denmark, the UK, and Ireland (and Norway and 
Iceland that are not EU member states). Austria and Italy joined in 1997, 
Greece in 2000, before Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway 
in 2001.  The year 2007 then brought in nine additional countries: 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Estonia, and Malta.  
 
Interestingly enough, Schengen continues to be marked more by its Cold 
War era birth than by the post-Cold War period when it came into force.  
The initial steps for launching a fully liberalized internal market came, 
first, when the Cold War provided a clear limit to the EU‟s potential 
geographical domain, not to mention security-oriented reasons to 
construct an integrated economic bulwark.  Even more than a decade 
after 1989, it is indeed easy to forget how the division of Europe into East 
and West facilitated European economic integration by providing a 
seemingly natural limit on the number of countries that could be 
included.  The continuing formidableness of the Soviet Union too 
facilitated cooperation by providing a shared threat.   
 
The idea of allowing free movement had also been around since the 1957 
Treaty of Rome created the Common Market and allowed the free 
movement of workers across EC member states‟ borders – though 
excluding migrant workers from ex-colonies, north Africa, and Eastern 
Europe.  The second part of the equation then lies in the economic 
liberalization developing since the end of Second World War and coming 
into full swing in the 1980‟s; in combination with a more restrictive 
attitude towards accepting refugees in Western Europe commencing in 
the 1970‟s.  The first key move in the direction of liberalizing capital 
flows came when the OECD drew up the Code of Liberalization of 
Capital Movements in 1961 to end restrictions among member states “to 
the extent necessary for effective economic cooperation” (Goodman and 
Pauly 1993: 51-53). Yet, in view of payment imbalances and rigid 
exchange rates, however, governments of nearly all industrial countries 
continued to exercise some control over capital flows during the 1960‟s 
(Goodman and Pauly 1993: 51-53).  Even the demise of the Bretton 
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Woods system of exchange rates in the early 1970‟s did not signal 
deregulation.   
 
Concerning population flows, on the other hand, West European asylum 
and immigration policies were comparatively liberal during this same 
time.  Governments were anything but against East→West migration as 
this trend appeared proof positive of capitalist democracy‟s superiority.  
It was only with the refugee flows accompanying postcolonial conflicts 
that led to a progressive tightening of immigration and asylum policies.   
 
While this was occurring in the 1970‟s, capital markets were beginning to 
loosen and the free flow of West European labor across borders gained 
greater importance.  Two catalysts were key in the liberalization of 
investment flows:  first, the steep growth of international financial 
markets (combined with technological changes that quickened the 
transfer process); and second, the fact that more businesses began to 
think in terms of arranging production globally (Goodman and Pauly 
1993: 51-53). Along with other benefits FDI can bring, the desire to 
avoid capital controls was indeed an important part of this latter trend.  
When controls in a particular country became comparatively high, for 
example, firms situated therein could execute their exit option without 
closing shop by simply shifting some operations to subsidiaries in 
countries with fewer regulations (Goodman and Pauly 1993: 58).  
Governments subsequently came to the realization that instituting 
restrictions thought to decrease predicted return would lead to capital 
flight, and with it, jobs and part of the tax base Scharpf 1999:  39). 
International events such as the GATT and WTO negotiations also 
furthered this trend by supporting reductions in tariffs and restrictions on 
quantities of particular imports, not to mention supporting the replication 
of British- and U.S.-based privatization and deregulation (Scharpf 1999: 
39). With the added incentive of competing against U.S. economic 
power, the EU facilitated liberalization through creating the internal 
market and, given the more restrictive attitude towards refugees and other 
immigrants, the emphasis on creating geographical limits to it.  
 
The first serious mention of allowing greater liberalization of human 
movement within particular geographic limits came within the summary 
of the EC‟s 1974 Paris Conference stating that working groups would be 
established to help create a passport union for member states.  The main 
issue that hindered the development of the union was the difficulty of 
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differentiating between EC nationals and citizens of third countries, 
particularly since states would not give up any of their ability to make 
sovereign decisions on immigration and asylum policy without great 
reluctance.  While the European Commission began to work on the 
creation of a European passport, the inflow of asylum seekers after the 
late 1970‟s did not help increase interest in the idea of harmonization.  
Later, the Commission reacted by toning down its emphasis on removing 
all controls to simply make cross border movement easier (Taschner 
1997:  16).  In the end, it was only through a slow step-by-step process 
that the idea of harmonizing policies towards third countries gained a 
modicum of acceptance (outlined in Taschner 1997). 
 
Given that the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty made the Schengen system a part 
of the EU‟s framework, all CEE applicant countries subsequently 
commencing their negotiation processes with the EU would have no 
choice but to accept it.  Given some member states‟ hypersensitivity 
concerning increased crime and unemployment spurred by immigration 
from the East, the EU has demanded that incoming states demonstrate 
their readiness to police these borders by implementing reforms prior to 
formal entry.  It is in this way that the EU uses the Schengen system 
along with its sizeable leverage to provide a second line of defense 
against unwanted immigration – yet a policy that does not have strong 
social support in these incoming states.  Hungarian elites and society 
hardly wish to cut off ties with Hungarians in the near abroad, while their 
counterparts in Poland consider more open borders necessary for stability 
next door to the east. 
 
Understanding the particular conditions within which Schengen arose 
signals how much it was a product of its time – the economic 
liberalization wave gaining speed in the beginning of the 1980‟s, the 
desire to revive the goals of Rome, and caution towards accepting asylum 
seekers and immigrants during the Cold War.  Though CEE too confronts 
increased economic liberalization, these countries were not involved in 
the shaping of the Single Market, nor do they wish to construct hard 
borders with their neighbors to the East.  Requiring the adoption of the 
Schengen border ultimately runs against liberal principles that the EU 
and other international organizations desire to cultivate in CEE – yet, 
within the contemporary context, appear politically crucial for elites in a 
number of older EU member states concerned about population 
movements from the East.   
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Schengen and the Reconstruction of Ethnic Hierarchies 
Ethnic hierarchies in Europe certainly pre-dated Schengen.  Yet, the 
construction of a hard border delineating „Europe‟ from „not-Europe‟ (or 
„not-fully-Europe‟) furthers the sense of civilizational superiority inside 
the Schengen group and inferiority outside of it.  This was certainly true 
in the case of the Polish-German border – until recently, the longest 
frontier on the EU‟s outer eastern boundary.  Given its greater length, 
strict north-south direction, and particular geopolitical location, the 
Polish-German border took on particular importance as symbolic divider 
between „East‟ and „West‟ after German reunification.  Polish sociologist 
Zbiegniew Kurcz points out the irony of this symbolism. 
 
After October 1990, the Polish-German border became simultaneously 
the eastern border of the EU and NATO.  What is equally important is 
that in the social consciousness of millions of Poles and of our eastern 
neighbors the Polish-German border became the border of two worlds.  
The first is identified with well-being, increases in economic 
development, democracy, and consumption, whereas the second, to an 
equally natural degree, with deficiency and social problems resulting 
from the departure of a planned economy that until recently exercised 
near total control.  It is of course possible to provide evidence that 
elements of a market economy and of citizen freedoms existed more in 
Poland than in East Germany in earlier years.  That, however, does not 
change the fact that in a relatively short time the East Germans accepted 
the values, aims, and standards practiced in the FRD – what, though, only 
recently confirms the civilizational and cultural function of the Polish-
German border as the border between Eastern and Western Europe 
(Kurcz 1992:  2). 
 
Kurcz rightly points to the importance of associations frequently made 
between nationality and the level of material culture, leading nationalities 
associated with richer states to be accorded greater esteem and more 
positive qualities. Such asymmetries matter a great deal for issues of 
nationality because a higher standard of living automatically builds 
respect and diminishes the resonance of prejudice.  One need only 
contrast Poles‟ respect for Germans despite strong memories of German 
domination and Germans‟ more negative attitudes towards Poles, not to 
mention Ukrainians‟ greater respect for Poles than vice versa.  Without a 
doubt, the substantial material inequalities between Poland and Germany 
– and later, the shift of Schengen to this border – helped to make this the 
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preeminent East-West divide.  This division was indeed far more natural 
than the German-German border of the communist era – a construction 
that is already reproducing itself now that the EU‟s outer border has 
shifted to Poland‟s border with Ukraine and Belarus. 
 
Compared to their counterparts in other CEE states now within the EU, 
Polish and Hungarian elites place the highest value on maintaining a 
relatively open border with neighbors to the East – meaning that ideally 
no visas should be required for entry from citizens from neighboring 
states.  Polish elites have taken such a border, particularly with Ukraine, 
to be crucial for stability in the region while Hungarian elites resist 
making entry difficult for the large number of Hungarians in the near 
abroad.  For Poland, making Ukrainians in particular face these controls 
not only contradicts earlier assurances of openness, but impedes any 
genuine form of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation over Second World War 
ethnic cleansing and the possibility of overcoming another great 
economic divide in Europe.  Even as late as 1998, in fact, Polish 
politicians promised their Ukrainian counterparts that the Polish-
Ukrainian border will be “just as open as it always was” after Poland‟s 
EU entry (Pawlicki 2002: 12). This was contradicted not long afterward 
when the Polish government accepted a resolution signaling that visas 
would be demanded of Belorussians and Russians – with Ukrainians 
requiring them only the moment Poland joined the EU (Pawlicki 2002:  
12).  While the Buzek government agreed to have the controls operative 
in 2001, the succeeding Miller government pushed the date to 1 July 
2003 – for the introduction of visas for Russians, Belorussians, and 
Ukrainians (Pawlicki 2002:  12). 
 
The first explicit signal concerning visa requirements came from the 
EU‟s 1998 “Partnership for Membership.” This document mandated visas 
for Belorussians, Russians, and Ukrainians as one of the policy changes 
for the Polish government to undertake (Bielecki 1998a:  9).  The 
promotion of visas, in fact, just happened to follow on the heels of a 1997 
law on foreigners that tightened the eastern border.  Coming into force in 
December 1997, this legislation required Belorussians and Russians 
entering Poland to have their vouchers validated beforehand either by a 
government official or a notary confirming possession of enough funds to 
cover their stay.  The appropriate vouchers could no longer be cheaply 
bought at a bazaar and rose in cost from $1 to $20 (Gęstsze sito 1998:  3). 
While the introduction of the 1997 law was often taken to be due to EU 
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pressure, it would have eventually been undertaken to bring the practice 
of border control into line with preexisting domestic legislation 
(Bachmann 2000: A9).  Nevertheless, implementing the law signaled 
clear intent to increase controls along this border when it was becoming 
increasingly important to be taken seriously by the EU.  Financial 
compensation came in the form of an EU-funded program to modernize 
the Polish eastern border with Poland receiving € 15 million ($ 17 
million) in 1998 (Bielecki 1998b:  3). 
 
At least two significant things resulted from the 1997 law‟s coming into 
force.  First, sales at bazaars on the Polish side dropped significantly – 
bazaars being a key source of income and employment in economically 
depressed border areas, particularly those with some degree of economic 
asymmetry.  1999 figures indeed show that sales were only 41% of what 
they had been in 1996. Second, a local (to the eastern border area) and 
national debate took place over the legitimacy of the controls and of the 
necessity of the bazaars in Poland.  However, it is difficult to be certain 
what the general view on the control of the eastern border is as opinion 
surveys from 1994 and 1998 show that respondents tended not to 
embrace „free movement‟ (swobodny ruch) across the eastern border.  
Respondents‟ views concerning a fully open border (meaning no controls) 
cannot simply be assumed to hold for their views on a relatively open 
border – like the one that has existed since the end of the Cold War up 
until the application of the Schengen system.  The highest percentage in 
both years, in fact, agreed with the view that an open border would not be 
overwhelmingly beneficial.  56% in 1994 and 44% in 1998 said that 
freedom of movement across the border for Polish citizens and nationals 
of the former Soviet Union brings more harm than good.  24% in 1994 
and 28% in 1998 said that such freedom would bring as much good as 
bad, while 7% and later 17% thought that it brings more good than bad. 
Most noteworthy in this survey, however, is the positive trend in thinking 
about an open eastern border.  Those holding a negative view to free 
movement dropped 12% during these four years while those holding a 
positive view increased 10%.  
 
What these results show is, first, that respondents are generally against 
completely free movement across the eastern border, and second, that 
having a more open eastern border tends to make people favor it.  Despite 
this trend in positive thinking about an open eastern border policy, 
respondents from the 1998 survey chose heightened controls even at the 
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cost of harm to the bazaars and markets if their adoption would have led 
to quicker EU entry.  Undertaken about two months after the 1997 law 
came into effect, this survey asked respondents if “we should adopt the 
conditions the EU is requiring and put forward the appropriate demands 
on travelers since it might help us to become a member of the EU more 
quickly even if doing so would have unfavorable effects on trade at the 
bazaars and markets.”  50% selected this response while 28% agreed 
instead that “we should not adopt the demands requested by the EU since 
they would be disadvantageous for trade at the bazaars and markets and 
Poland is still not a member of the EU.”  A significant 22% said that it 
was hard to say (Nowe przepisy 1998:  8).  Despite this high percentage, 
half of the respondents ranked the goal of gaining EU membership higher 
than the economic dislocation by tightening the border.   
 
While it is indeed difficult to foresee the effects of shifting the Schengen 
border to Poland‟s eastern border, two things are clear in the Polish case:  
(1)  requirements of adopting Schengen to join the EU have been the 
driving force behind tightened eastern border policies;  and  (2)  that such 
tightening in and of itself goes against the wishes of Polish elites, border 
residents, and potentially against the general population.  When 
combined with asymmetries in Poles‟ and Ukrainians‟ views of one 
another and the sizeable economic differences on either side of the 
border, Schengen will not likely improve Polish-Ukrainian relations, 
while also militating against the broader acceptance of liberal values. 
 
Schengen and the Reunification of a Greater Hungarian Nation 
Hungary‟s case against the need to tighten borders was even clearer. The 
implications of adopting stricter border controls did not sit well with the 
former Hungarian center-right party in power from 1998-2002 and again 
beginning in 2010 (FIDESZ). The party has secured its electoral base, in 
part, through a strong focus on cultivating ties with the large numbers of 
ethnic Hungarians in the near abroad.  Their formal separation from 
Hungary has been a prominent issue in Hungarian politics ever since the 
1920 Treaty of Trianon left Hungary with only approximately one third 
of its former population and territory.  Thereafter Hungary became one of 
the most ethnically homogenous countries in the region.  Such 
homogeneity, however, did not characterize neighboring states such as 
Romania with 1.7 million Hungarians, Czechoslovakia with 
approximately 900,000 Hungarians, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes (Yugoslavia) with its 550,000 Hungarian minority, and Austria 
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with approximately 26,000 Hungarians (Kovrig 2000: 25). Today 
approximately 43% of Hungarians live outside of Hungary, with 34.5% 
living in the neighboring states of Romania, Slovakia, and the Vojvodina 
district of Serbia (Dostal 1996:  12-13). 
 
Convinced that ethnic Hungarian immigration would surge prior to the 
installation of the Schengen border, the Hungarian government passed a 
bill in the summer of 2001 that not only magnified the salience of 
Hungarian identity in neighboring states, but also increased tensions in 
elite-level relations with Slovakia and Romania.  With a 92% majority, 
the Hungarian parliament approved the so-called „Status Bill‟ on June 19, 
2001.  In force as of January 1, 2002, this legislation grants subsidies to 
Hungarians abroad for health care, education, culture, and transportation 
along with an identity card giving them assistance in traveling to and for 
finding work in Hungary. Though the primary reason for considering the 
Status Bill was to forestall excessive Hungarian immigration prior to the 
shift of the Schengen border, Hungarian officials mentioned at least two 
additional motivations.  First, Hungarian Premier Viktor Orban noted a 
need to increase the labor supply, indicating that only Hungarians would 
be allowed to fill these positions.  On June 7, 2001, for example, Orban 
stated that the country could take in “up to four million Magyar settlers” 
[RFE/RL Newsline (8 June 2001)]. Second, Hungarian officials have 
referred repeatedly to a desire to fulfill a historical obligation to the 
Hungarian diaspora in the near abroad. As Hungarian Foreign Ministry 
State Secretary Zsolt Nemeth explained during a visit to Romania, 
Hungary is “repaying an 80-year old debt” by passing the Status Bill – a 
clear reference to the Trianon Treaty [RFE/RL Newsline (21 May 2001)]. 
Speaking more strategically, FIDESZ likely used the law to court two 
groups of voters:  (1)  less radical supporters of the far-right Hungarian 
Justice and Life Party (MIEP) and (2) disillusioned voters from the 
disintegrated Independent Smallholder‟s Party (FKGP) (Kingston 2001:  
2-3). 
 
Under FIDESZ in particular, Hungary‟s push to join the EU was framed 
as a route to undo the forced split with Hungarians in the near abroad 
through lessening the importance of state borders – again a signal that, 
for Hungary, the idea of „joining Europe‟ can be put to the service of the 
nation.  Zsuzsa Csergő and James Goldgeier explain the reaction of 
Slovakia and Romania: 
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     The Hungarian effort to „virtualize‟ political borders was highly 
problematic in an area where neighboring states continued to place strong 
emphasis on maintaining their territorial sovereignty, which in many 
cases was newly acquired.  The legacies of past relationships between 
Hungarians and their neighbors – a history of dominance and 
subordination followed by reversals of fortune – contributed to Romanian 
and Slovak perceptions that the Status Law was merely a guise for the 
desire to reincorporate territories and „imperial‟ ethnic kin that Hungary 
had lost through the 1920 Treaty of Trianon.  Hungarians are a formerly 
dominant group in the neighborhood and may be using EU integration to 
reclaim their earlier position (Csergő and Goldgeier 2005:  8-9). 
 
Repeated references to Trianon alone did not make the Bill controversial 
for neighboring states.  It was the implied institutionalization of positive 
discrimination according to nationality directed, to a significant degree, 
by a foreign government associated with regional domination.  This point 
was not lost on Slovak and Romanian officials.  Slovak Foreign Minister 
Eduard Kukan worried aloud that the necessity of differentiating between 
Hungarians and non-Hungarians might „introduce discrimination‟ 
[RFE/RL Newsline (16 May 2001)]. The Romanian Cabinet went farther 
by arguing that the Bill is indeed discriminatory and that it encroaches on 
international law.  It also stated that any aspects of the Bill contradicting 
bilateral treaties between the two states would not be in force “on 
Romania‟s sovereign territory” [RFE/RL Newsline (20 June 2001)]. 
Members of the Greater Romania Party in the Chamber of Deputies, 
moreover, submitted draft legislation after the Status Bill‟s passage that 
would give dual citizenship to all those applying for the Hungarian 
identity card, thus depriving them of the right to hold public or military 
office (applicable to all those who hold dual citizenship in Romania). 
 
Though members of the diaspora would not have citizenship status, 
Prime Minister Viktor Orban‟s comments from December 2000 certainly 
imply otherwise.  “I hope this Hungarian identity card will say very 
nicely that the person who possesses this document is a citizen belonging 
to the Hungarian nation, a nation-citizen, if you like.  The person owning 
this card will be entitled to enjoy preferences or rights stemming from 
his/her special status…  This will create a special legal situation, a special 
status for them” (Hungary 2001:  21).  Prior to even dispersing these 
benefits, however, a process had to first take shape to determine who 
possesses Hungarian identity.  The Hungarian government‟s Office for 
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Hungarians Beyond Borders indicated that Hungarian identity would be 
conferred “on the basis of a recommendation by a recommending 
organization beyond the border [and would include] all those who profess 
themselves to belong to the Hungarian nation and who declare this in 
writing and those who can make this statement in Hungarian, that is to 
say, they [can prove that they] speak in Hungarian…” (Hungary 2001:  
21).  
 
Though Hungarians residing in the near abroad tend to exhibit a high 
degree of national consciousness, the process of determining who is a 
Hungarian and of then administering the benefits only increased the 
political salience of nationality differences – a process that would not 
have been deemed necessary without pressures to tighten borders to the 
east and south.  A 2001 survey of Romanians in Transylvania, in fact, 
showed that almost half of the respondents thought that rights accorded to 
ethnic Hungarians were too generous.  Many also thought Hungarians 
living in Romania – particularly in Transylvania – feel greater loyalty to 
Hungary than to Romania (Kingston 2001:  13).  Though suggestive of 
the Status Law‟s effects, these results were likely influenced by the 
specific political circumstances surrounding the poll.  Carried out by an 
institute recently headed by Romania‟s Public Communications Minister, 
the results were released at a time when the government had a keen 
interest in sculpting negative public opinion towards the Status Law 
(Kingston 2001:  13). 
 
The COE, the OSCE‟s High Commissioner, and the EU all subsequently 
issued evaluations of the Status Law, reports that Hungarian elites took 
seriously.  While an October 2001 report from the COE‟s Venice 
Commission ruled that no legislation with foreign application could be 
implemented without involved foreign countries‟ consent [RFE/RL 
Newsline (19 October 2001], OSCE High Commissioner Rolf Ekeus‟s 
criticism was far more direct in faulting the unilateral nature of the Status 
Law and its potential to create conflict [RFE/RL Newline (29 October 
2001)].  The EU‟s country report on Hungary released on 13 November 
was also critical, yet did not go so far as to state that the law runs counter 
to the acquis [RFE/RL Newsline (14 November 2001)].  In an apparent 
change of mind over the Venice Commission‟s report, a draft of a 
subsequent COE report released in June 2002 harshly criticized the Status 
Law, recommending that it be replaced by a new law passed only after 
consultations with neighboring states.  This report claims that the Law 
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actually violates EU norms such as non-discrimination, good neighborly 
relations, and respect for sovereignty [RFE/RL Newsline (13 June 
2002)].  Clearly, the opportunity to observe the law‟s effects on inter-
ethnic relations changed the COE‟s view considerably. 
 
Though the Status Law was also FIDESZ‟s tool to retain power (along 
with EU pressures to tighten borders), the succeeding socialist-led 
government did not move immediately to abolish it.  Hungary‟s 
succeeding Socialist-Party Prime Minister, Peter Medgyessy, in fact 
appeared no less concerned about the Hungarian diaspora.  Like Antall 
and Orban before him, Medgyessy claimed feeling responsible for 15 
million Hungarians, rather than just the 10 million living in Hungary 
[RFE/RL Newsline (9 May 2002)].  While the Medgyessy government 
approved an amendment deleting references to a unified Hungarian 
nation [RFE/RL Newsline (24 June 2003)], its failure to consult 
neighboring states that would ultimately implement the law did not 
diminish contention.   
 
Nevertheless, improvements were made in Hungarian-Romanian and 
Hungarian-Slovak relations over the Status Law.  In September 2003, the 
Romanian and Hungarian Prime Ministers signed a bilateral agreement 
concerning the Law‟s implementation.  It stipulates two important 
changes that de-emphasize Hungarian identity.  First, Hungarian ID cards 
can only be issued in Hungary, must not carry the insignia of Greater 
Hungary, nor can they resemble passports.  Second and more 
importantly, institutions rather than individuals are to be the recipients of 
financial aid for preserving Hungarian culture [RFE/RL Newsline (24 
September 2003)].  A similar agreement was reached between Hungary 
and Slovakia in December 2003.  Such changes have ultimately 
diminished contention over the Status Law. 
 
Looking ahead to the future, it will be interesting to see how the 
opportunity for „Hungarian reunification‟ affects identity politics.  Will 
the bringing down of borders empower Hungarian minorities and make 
them less likely to organize as Hungarians (thus often provoking 
discriminatory responses)?  Or will the reality of „reunification‟ be 
perceived as a threat to Romanians and especially to Slovaks; the latter 
holding still-strong memory of a thousand year existence under 
Hungarian rule? 
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Schengen and the Creation of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ 
The emergence of the Schengen system has given credence to sub-state 
regionalism manifested in the idea of creating a „Europe of the regions.‟  
The practical implementation of this idea in CEE runs from Hungary‟s 
efforts to re-unite a greater Hungarian nation to EU support for 
„Euroregions.‟  Euroregions are geographically demarcated areas 
spanning state borders possessing a very loose institutional structure 
geared towards furthering collaboration between local governments on 
either side of the border(s).  While the Euroregion projects have been 
perceived as threats to identity and sovereignty in some states, again for 
Hungary they harmonize nicely with the Hungarian reunification project.  
Relating this project to the Status Law, Orban notes: 
 
I am convinced that the [Status Law] contains a number of novelties 
judging even by European standards and it also outlines a Hungarian 
concept about the Europe of the future.  During the time of de Gaulle, the 
French thought that the European Union has to be a union of states 
belonging to Europe.  During the time of Chancellor Kohl the Germans 
came to the conclusion that the Union has to be the Europe of the regions.  
And now, we Hungarians have come up with the idea that the Europe of 
the future should be a Europe of communities, the Europe of national 
communities, and this is what the [Status Law] is all about (quoted in 
Csergő and Goldgeier 2004:  28). 
  
Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi advanced a similar view 
claiming that while states in the new EU-bounded Europe would retain 
their role as primary decision-making bodies, Europe‟s future would 
essentially be determined by its various communities (Kingston 2001:  8). 
 
Though Hungary‟s reunification efforts might at times prove unsettling to 
Romanians, the Romanian elite similarly employed the reunification idea 
in the context of European integration with respect to Romanians in 
Moldova and Ukraine.  Thus, Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Năstase 
advanced the idea of the EU as a „union of nations‟ (Csergő and 
Goldgeier 2004:  28), while Romanian President Ion Iliescu claimed that 
“European borders cannot be changed, but integration into the EU will 
inevitably relegate the importance of national borders.”  Illiescu added 
that “Romania supports the integration of the Republic of Moldova and 
Ukraine into European structures.  Bucharest wanted to preserve the 
cultural and linguistic unity of Romanians all over the world” (quoted in 
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Kingston 2001:  8). Yet, Hungary has pursued transovereign nationalism 
with greater vigor given two factors:  (1)  far more ethnically 
homogeneous Hungary has little to fear from similar campaigns coming 
from other states than multiethnic Romania, and (2)  nation- and state-
building began considerably earlier in Hungary, leaving ethnic 
Hungarians in the near abroad with a stronger sense of Hungarian identity 
(Csergő and Goldgeier 2005:  15). Though appealing to nationalities 
wanting to reunite a nation spilling well over state borders, the creation of 
a Europe of the regions can also be threatening in two related instances:  
(1)  in states with border areas that recently experienced border shifts 
and/or population expulsions, and (2)  in border areas of weak states, 
ones that are fragmented given higher degrees of ethnic diversity.  Both 
the Czech-German and Polish-German borders are excellent examples of 
the former given their repeated shifts in the 20
th
 century and large-scale 
German expulsions.  Both also have shown some concern over the 
development of Euroregions spanning these border regions as being part 
and parcel of increased German power.  Czech and Polish opponents of 
Euroregions have claimed that they are a mechanism promoted by 
Germany to further economic expansion in the region (Bazin 2003:  227).  
While Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus characteristically claimed the 
Euroregions as a potential threat to identity, his Polish counterparts 
questioned whether they would lead to the dismemberment of the Polish 
state itself.  After voting on the creation of the Carpathian Euroregion 
spanning the Polish, Ukrainian, and Slovak borders in 1993, the Sejm 
produced an official statement claiming “Euroregions cannot become a 
means of denying the sovereign power of Poland over parts of her 
territory” (quoted in Malendowski 2000:  22). 
 
The second situation when creating a „Europe of the regions‟ appears 
threatening concerns border areas of weak, fragmented states, states not 
holding significant power and legitimacy over a diverse population.  Judy 
Batt makes this point when discussing the effect of European integration 
on two of CEE‟s historic subregions that lie largely on the other side of 
the new Schengen border:  (1)  the Banat – encompassing the two 
counties in southeast Romania, and (2)  Transcarpathia – the westernmost 
region of Ukraine.  Both have developed historically as regions despite 
border changes and population movements occurring in the 20
th
 century.  
Given their relative western location and greater identification with 
Europe, elites there have adopted the „Central European argument‟ to 
claim that these areas are more civilized and ultimately culturally 
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superior to the more „barbaric‟ Russian-controlled areas to the East (Batt 
2002:  507-508). 
 
This sense of uniqueness along with EU efforts to support the 
development of border regions (even cutting across the Schengen border) 
has created a sense of insecurity among the Romanian and Ukrainian 
elite.  Though Romanians like Năstase and Iliescu might support the idea 
of a „Europe of the regions‟ to forge closer ties with Romanians in 
Ukraine and Moldova, the same idea can be unsettling in regards to 
Hungarians in Hungary „reuniting‟ with Hungarians in Transylvania – the 
by product of FIDESZ‟s own pursuit of crossborder Hungarian 
reunification. 
 
Ukrainian elites had similar concerns when debating the new 
constitution.  Passed in 1996, it continued with the existing system of 
oblasti and claimed that Ukraine‟s territorial structure would be based on 
“the principle of centralization and decentralization in the exercise  of 
state power” (Article 132 quoted in Batt 2002:  518).  As Judy Batt points 
out, this sentence obscures a rather disorganized reality, one that former 
President Kuchma used to justify defacto centralization.  According to 
Kuchma:  “Practically [today] nobody rules Ukraine.  [At the regional 
level] everybody is interested in his own welfare.  The interests of the 
people and the practical issues of running the state are pushed to the side.  
These are the first signs of disintegration of the state… We have to 
eliminate such manifestations of contemporary local feudalism, take 
radical measures to restore order, [and] protect our citizens” (quoted in 
Batt 2002:  518-519).  Kiev was indeed paying attention to demands for 
autonomy coming from the areas with strong regional identities and with 
the longest ties to other states (Batt 2002:  518).  While the idea of 
creating a „Europe of the regions‟ appears appealing to Hungarian and 
Romanian elites when thinking of ties with large numbers of „kin‟ in the 
near abroad, the same idea can also appear threatening to (weak) states 




While instituted in the name of liberalizing the Single Market, the 
continuing development of the Schengen system contradicts the liberal, 
identity-blind ideology behind the Market.  After showing that Schengen 
was ultimately the product of another time and place and that the 
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system‟s implementation only furthers ethnic hierarchies, this article 
explains why the idea of creating a „Europe of the regions‟ can suggest a 
destabilizing balance of power among Europe‟s less historically secure 
nationalities.  By helping Hungarian elites in particular to pursue the 
„reunification‟ of their nation, in fact, this project can be interpreted as a 
threat to neighboring states with large numbers of Hungarians.  
Ultimately, Schengen‟s inadvertent support for a Europe of the regions, 
its fortification of ethnic hierarchies, not to mention tightening borders 
along the new eastern Schengen border, only militates against the broader 
acceptance of liberal values. 
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